The Sunni's Predicament

The Belmont Club discussed a fascinating irony that is occurring in Iraq. But first, a little background.

The Sunnis in Iraq
The Sunnis have long been the dominant faction in Iraqi politics and culture, despite being a significant minority of the population. When Saddam Hussein (a Sunni) was removed from power, many of the other Sunni power centers were disbanded, such as the army and much of the government. The Sunnis were left a powerless minority group who had, while in power, mercilessly pushed the other groups down. It is obvious that they were worried about reprisals.

I should say here that I am speaking in broad generalities, and that not all of the Sunnis in Iraq fall under my description in this article. However, I need a descriptive label so I am using 'Sunni'.

The Formation of the New Iraqi Government
It was an amazing sight in December of 2004 when the people of Iraq voted to form their first democratic government ever. Millions of people bravely voted despite serious threats, hoping to achieve peace and stability. President Bush outlined his dream of Iraqi democracy here.

The Sunnis, in large part, did not participate. In fact, at least 23 Sunni clerics were murdered for supporting Sunni participation in the democratic government. Many Sunnis stayed home from the elections as a protest, but many others stayed home out of fear of their own people. Having such a large group left out of the government was a terrible problem.

These words from 2 years ago seem powerfully prescient.

A western diplomat in Baghdad said: "The effective disenfranchisement of the Sunni Arabs could have dire consequences for the political security of Iraq. We can't afford to marginalise the Sunnis even further. It will do nothing to stem the rising tide of factionalism and sectarianism."

But Iraq's interim leaders know any decision to delay or skew the result could alienate leading figures among the Shia majority, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. "We are damned if we go ahead, and damned if we delay," said an Iraqi minister who requested anonymity.

It was a difficult decision to make; wait for the Sunnis to feel ready, or anger the Shiites. The bottom line is that the Sunnis chose to not be part of the political process. Of course, after the election, they realized their mistake, and wanted in.

From what I observed, the situation in Iraq throughout 2005 was serious, but slow progress was being made. Sunni attacks against Shiites were constant and deadly, but the Shiite masses were amazingly patient.

For their part, Shi'ite politicians point out that thousands in their community have been killed in Sunni terrorist attacks since the fall of Saddam Hussein. "After every tragedy, every time that the terrorists pour [gasoline] over our emotions, we tell our people to be patient, to remain calm," said Jassim al-Mutairi, a political aide to al-Sadr. "But each time, we worry that the next [terrorist] attack will be the one to light the match."

The Bombing of the Golden Mosque
On Feb 22, 2006, the Al-Askari Mosque was bombed. It seems to me that this was a deadly turning point in Iraq.

Why is this Mosque so important?.

Time Magazine reported at the time of the Al Askari Mosque bombing that “al-Askari [is] one of Shiite Islam's holiest sites, exceeded in veneration only by the shrines of Najaf and Karbala. Even Samarra's Sunnis hold al-Askari in high esteem. The expression 'to swear by the shrine' is routinely used by both communities".

It would seem that the bombing was the last straw for many Shiites. The violence against the Sunnis escalated all year and the situation in Iraq seems to be at the most unstable point since the invasion. There were obviously many other factors that have caused the decline of stability, but I believe that this bombing was critical.

Sunni Miscalculations
The Sunnis made a series of mistakes that has led them, and their entire country, to the brink.

The first and fatal miscalculation by the Sunnis was to think they could drive the US Armed Forces from Iraq, a gamble which they lost. Encouraged by the absence of a crushing campaign in northern Iraq, itself possibly caused by the absence of the 4ID from the OIF order of battle, and alienated by the American decision to "de-Baathize" Iraq, many former military Sunnis chose to continue resistance using guerrilla tactics. By March, 2004 they were ready. The insurgent uprising of early 2004 that culminated in the abortive First Battle of Fallujah, which still saw the Shi'ites in as militarily inferiors.

The Sunni insurgency compounded its military failures by ruthlessly suppressing any attempts by their ethnic leaders to participate in political process sponsored by the Coalition and by murdering any Sunni who came forward to join the new Army and Police. The result was that Sunnis were underrepresented in both the Constitutional convention and in the elections of 2005.

I would add another mistake was the insurgency's focus on violence against the Shiites. This has created a murderous rage among the Iraqi Shia.

And now for the irony
Wretchard at The Belmont Club points out:

In an irony that must rank as one of the most curious in history, the insurgency in al-Anbar finds it must continue precisely because of the threat of a US drawdown. At the end of a sequence of blunders, Sunni strategists have managed to add yet one more. It is a continuation of a failed policy which begun with the Sunnis defying the US Armed Forces; that led to US Armed Forces building up a Shi'ite Army; that resulted in the crushing of Sunni strongholds. It continued in their absurd response to defeat: provoking civil unrest in an internal conflict they could not hope to win. That civil unrest has come within a handsbreadth of politically driving America from Iraq. And now they realize too late that an American withdrawal means their inevitable massacre in a war they are now too weak to win.

So, the Sunnis started the insurgency to get rid of the Americans, but find themselves instead required to keep up the violence in order to keep the Americans in Iraq! They (rightly) feel that if they allow the insurgency to slow or stop, the Americans will leave. The Sunnis are convinced that when the Americans leave, the Shiites will either slaughter them, or drive them from Iraq.

Is there a solution? The Belmont Club proposes this:

What must be done now is give the Sunni population a modicum of the security and prospects that they have thrown away. Only by guaranteeing them the secure retreat guarded by a Sunni force is their any hope of teasing them back into a political process they have ceded on a platter to the Shias.

Give the insurgents a safe haven and a large piece of the political pie? However unlikely to succeed, it seems to be the best possibility. I hope that there are enough wise leaders left in Iraq to lead them out of this mess. It is truly up to the Iraqis to stand up and embrace the opportunity they've been given.